Adversarial Data Mining for Cyber Security

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Big data and Cyber Security

Gartner Report: Big Data will Revolutionize Cyber Security in the Next Two Years
by Saroj Kar on February 12, 2014 · 2 Comments

Organizations are more than ever exposed to a large number and variety of threats and risks to cyber security. Big Data will be one of the main elements of change in the enterprises by supplying intelligence-driven models.

Research firm Gartner said that big data analytics will play a crucial role in detecting crime and security infractions. By 2016, more than 25 percent of global firms will adopt big data analytics for at least one security and fraud detection use case, up from current eight percent.
Already many start-ups in the field.

Cybersecurity is the killer app for big data analytics

Big data analytics tools will be the first line of defense to provide holistic and integrated security threat prediction, detection, and deterrence and prevention programs.
More data is available for cyber security

- Malware samples
- System Logs
- Firewall Logs
- Sensor data
- ...

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Cyber Security is Different

• Many adversarial learning problems in practice
  – Intrusion Detection
  – Fraud Detection
  – Spam Detection
  – Malware Detection
• Adversary *adapts* to avoid being detected.

• New solutions are needed to address this problem
The Problem

- Violation of standard *i.i.d.* assumption
- Adversary modifies data to defeat learning algorithms
Example: Spam Filtering

- Millions way to write Viagra

From: "Ezra Martens" <ezrabngktbbem...>
To: "Eleftheria Marconi" <clifton@pu...>
Subject: shunless Phaxrrrmaceutical
Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2005 04:49:10 -0500

Hello,
Easy Fast =
Best Home Total
OrdeShipPrricDelivConf
ringpingeseryidential
VIAAmbCIAlevVALXan
GRAienLISitraIUMax
$  $ $$
3.33 1.21 3.75
Get =additional infrommation attempted to
Understanding Adversarial Learning

- It is not **concept drift**
- It is not **online learning**
- Adversary adapts to avoid being detected
  - During training time (i.e., data poisoning)
  - During test time (i.e., modifying features when data mining is deployed)
- There is **game** between the data miner and the adversary
Solution Ideas

• Constantly adapt your classifier to changing adversary behavior.

• Questions??
  – How to model this game?
  – Does this game ever end?
  – Is there an equilibrium point in the game?
Agenda

• Summary of foundational results/models to reason about learning in the presence of an active adversary
  – No proofs/ Summary of the models
• Modified techniques resistant to adversarial behavior
• Some applications of data mining for cyber security/practical attacks
• Summary/Suggestions
Foundations
Learning in the Presence of Malicious Errors [1]

- Training data contains malicious noise.
- The adversary has
  - unbounded computational resource
  - knowledge of target concept, target distributions, internal states of the learning algorithm
- With probability $\beta$ ($0 \leq \beta < 1/2$), the adversary gets to generate malicious errors.
- The adversary’s goal is to foil the learning algorithm.
Optimal Malicious Error Rates

- Optimal malicious error rates for a class $C$:
  - $E_M(C)$:
    - the largest value of $\beta$ that can be tolerated by any learning algorithm for $C$
    - Upper bound
  - $E_M^P(C)$:
    - the largest rate of malicious error that can be tolerated by a polynomial-time learning algorithm for $C$
    - Lower bound
Theorem 1 *For a distinct concept class* \( C \),

\[
E_M(C) < \frac{\epsilon}{1 + \epsilon}
\]

– To learn an \( \epsilon \)-good hypothesis (type 1 and type error rates are less than \( \epsilon \)), a learning algorithm can only handle \( \beta < \epsilon/(1+ \epsilon) \).

– The bound holds regardless of the time or sample complexity of the learning algorithms for \( C \).

– The bound holds even for algorithms with unbounded computational resources.
Theorem 2 Let $C$ be a polynomial time learnable concept class in the error-free model by algorithm $A$ with sample complexity $s_A(\varepsilon, \delta)$ (learns a $\varepsilon$–hypothesis with prob. at $1 - \delta$ using $s_A(\varepsilon, \delta)$ samples ) and let $s = s_A(\varepsilon/8, 1/2)$. We can learn $C$ in polynomial time with an error rate of

$$\beta = \Omega(\min\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{8}, \frac{\ln s}{s}\right))$$

– $A$ is a $\beta$-tolerant Occam algorithm for $C$ if it is consistent with at least $1 - \varepsilon/2$ of the samples received from the faulty oracles.
Summary of [1]

- Error tolerance against data poisoning need not come at the expense of efficiency or simplicity if you have large enough data and attacker capabilities are bounded.
- Better tolerable error rates (upper bound) can be achieved using both types (+/-) of examples than positive-only or negative-only learning.
- Strong ties exist between learning with errors and data poisoning attacks.
Adversarial Classification [2]

• Data is manipulated by an adversary to increase false negatives.
  – Spam detection
  – Intrusion detection
  – Fraud detection

• Classification is considered as a game between the classifier and the adversary.
  – Both are cost-sensitive
Cost and Utility for Classifier & Adversary

- Given a training set $S$ and a test set $T$,
  - CLASSIFIER
    - learn from $S$ a classification function $y_C = C(x)$
    - $V_i$: cost of measuring the $i^{th}$ feature $X_i$
    - $U_C(y_C, y)$: utility of classifying an instance as $y_C$ with true class $y$
      - $U_C(+, -) < 0$, $U_C(-, +) < 0$, $U_C(+, +) > 0$, $U_C(-, -) > 0$
  - ADVERSARY
    - modify a positive instance in $T$ from $x$ to $x' = A(x)$
    - $W_i(x_i, x'_i)$: cost of changing the $i^{th}$ feature from $x_i$ to $x'_i$
    - $U_A(y_C, y)$: ADVERSARY's utility when the classifier classifies an instance as $y_C$ with true class $y$
      - $U_A(-, +) > 0$, $U_A(+, +) < 0$ and $U_A(-, -) = U_A(+, -) = 0$
A Single-step Two Players’ Game

• For computational tractability, the adversarial classification game only considers one move by each of the players.
• It also assumes that all parameters of both players are known to each other.
• Classifier is naïve Bayes:
  – an instance $x$ is classified positive if the expected utility of doing so exceeds that of classifying it as negative

$$\frac{P(+|x)}{P(-|x)} > \frac{U_C(-, -) - U_C(+, -)}{U_C(+, +) - U_C(-, +)}$$
Adversary’s Strategy

• Adversary’s optimal strategy:
  – Two assumptions:
    • complete Information
    • CLASSIFIER is unaware of its presence.
  – Modify features such that
    • The transformation cost is less than the expected utility.
    • The new instances is classified as negative.
  – Solve an integer LP
Classifier’s Strategy

• Classifier’s optimal strategy:
  – Three assumptions:
    • Adversary uses optimal strategy.
    • Training set is not tampered by Adversary.
    • The transformation cost $W_i(x_i, x'_i)$ is a semi-metric.
  – Make prediction $y_C$ that Maximizes conditional utility:
    $$U(y_C|x) = \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} P(y|x)U_C(y_C, y)$$
    with a post-adversary conditional probability
    $$P_A(x'|+) = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} P(x|+)P_A(x'|x, +)$$
• Consider cases where the classifier is modified after observing adversaries action.
  – Spam filter rules.

• **Stackelberg** Games
  – Adversary chooses an action $a_1$
  – After observing $a_1$, data miner chooses action $a_2$
  – Game ends with payoffs to each player

$$u_1(a_1, a_2), u_2(a_1, a_2)$$
We consider a two-class problem where one class is good and the other is bad. The probability distribution of the joint space is a mixture model:

\[ x = (x_1, x_2, x_3, \ldots, x_n) \]

\[ p_1 + p_2 = 1 \]

\[ f(x) = p_1 f_1(x) + p_2 f_2(x) \]

An adversary applies a transformation \( T \) to modify the bad class (i.e., \( f_2(x) \to f_2^T(x) \)).
• After observing transformation, data miner chooses an updated classifier $h$

• We define the payoff function for the data miner

$$f(x) = p_1 f_1(x) + p_2 f_2^T(x)$$

$$c(T, h) = \int_{L^h_1} c_{11} p_1 f_1(x) + c_{12} p_2 f_2^T(x) dx + \int_{L^h_2} c_{21} p_1 f_1(x) + c_{22} p_2 f_2^T(x) dx$$

$$u_2(T, h) = -c(T, h)$$

• $C_{ij}$ is the cost for classifying $x$ to class $i$ to given that it is in class $j$

• Data miner tries to minimize $c(T, h)$
Transformation has a cost for the adversary
   – Reduced effectiveness for spam e-mails

Let $g^T(x)$ be the gain of an element after transformation

Adversary gains for the “bad” instances that are classified as “good”

$$u_1(T, h) = \int_{L^2} g^T(x) f_2^T(x) dx$$
Given the transformation $T$, we can find the best response classifier $R(T)$ $h$ that minimizes the $c(T,h)$:

$$h_T(x) = \begin{cases} \pi_1, & (c_{12} - c_{22})p_2f_2^T(x) \leq (c_{21} - c_{11})p_1f_1(x) \\ \pi_2, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

For Adversarial Stackelberg game, subgame perfect equilibrium is:

$$T^* = \arg \max_{T \in S} \left(u_1(T, R(T))\right)$$

$$(T^*, R(T^*))$$
Adversarial Stackelberg Game Formulation Cont.

\[ g_e(T) = u_1(T, R_2(T)) \]
\[ = \int_{L^1_T}^{h_T} (g^T(x)f_2^T(x))dx \]
\[ = E_{f_2^T}(I_{\{L^1_T\}^h_T}(x) \times g^T(x)) \]

\[ T^* = \arg \max_{T \in S}(g_e(T)) \]

- If the game is repeated finitely many times, after an equilibrium is reached, each party does not have incentive change their actions.
Summary [3]: Attribute Selection for Adversarial Learning

• How to choose attributes for Adversarial Learning?
  – Choose the most predictive attribute
  – Choose the attribute that is hardest to change

• Example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>$\pi_1$</th>
<th>$\pi_2$</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
<th>Equilibrium Bayes Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$</td>
<td>N(1,1)</td>
<td>N(3,1)</td>
<td>$a = 1$</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$</td>
<td>N(1,1)</td>
<td>N(3.5,1)</td>
<td>$a = 0.45$</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_3$</td>
<td>N(1,1)</td>
<td>N(4,1)</td>
<td>$a = 0$</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Not so good ideas!!
Unlike the previous research, Bruckner & Scheffer consider Stackelberg games where the classifier is the leader and the adversary is the follower.

- Data miner chooses an action $a_1$
- After observing $a_1$, the adversary chooses action $a_2$
- Game ends with payoffs to each player

$$u_1(a_1, a_2), u_2(a_1, a_2)$$
Cost Definition

- Two-players game between learner (-1) and adversary (+1).
- The costs of the two players are defined as follows:

\[
\hat{\theta}_{-1}(w, \dot{D}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} c_{-1,i} \ell_{-1}(f_w(\hat{x}_i), y_i) + \rho_{-1} \hat{\Omega}_{-1}(w),
\]

\[
\hat{\theta}_{+1}(w, \dot{D}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} c_{+1,i} \ell_{+1}(f_w(\hat{x}_i), y_i) + \rho_{+1} \hat{\Omega}_{+1}(D, \dot{D}).
\]
Stackelberg Games

1. Learner decides on \( w \).
2. Adversary observes \( w \) and changes the data distribution.
3. Adversary minimizes its loss given \( w \) by searching for a sample \( D_w \) that leads to the global minimum of the loss

\[
D_w = \left\{ \left\{ (\hat{x}_i, y_i) \right\}_{i=1}^{n} : \{\hat{x}_i\}_{i=1}^{n} \in \arg\min_{\hat{x}_1', \ldots, \hat{x}_n' \in \mathcal{X}} \hat{\theta}+1 (w, \{(\hat{x}_i', y_i)\}_{i=1}^{n}) \right\}
\]
Assuming that the adversary will decide for any \( D \in D_w \), the learner has to choose model parameters \( w^* \) that minimize the learner’s cost function \( \theta_{-1} \) for any of the possible reactions \( D \in D_w \) that are optimal for the adversary:

\[
   w^* \in \arg\min_{w \in \mathbb{R}^m} \max_{\hat{D} \in \hat{D}_w} \hat{\theta}_{-1}(w, \hat{D})
\]

An action \( w^* \) that minimizes the learner’s costs and a corresponding optimal action \( D \in D_{w^*} \) of the adversary are called a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Finding Stackelberg Equilibrium

\[
\min_{\mathbf{w} \in \mathbb{R}^m} \max_{\forall i : \mathbf{x}_i \in \mathcal{X}} \hat{\theta}_- (\mathbf{w}, \{(\mathbf{x}_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^n)
\]

s.t.
\[
\{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i=1}^n \in \arg\min_{\mathbf{x}_1', \ldots, \mathbf{x}_n'} \hat{\theta}_+ (\mathbf{w}, \{(\mathbf{x}_i', y_i)\}_{i=1}^n)
\]

Stackelberg equilibrium is applicable when
1. the adversary is rational;
2. the predictive model is known to the adversary.
TECHNIQUES
Adversarial support vector machine learning [5]

- Support Vector machines try to find the hyperplane that has the highest possible separation margin.
Adversarial Attack Models

• Free-range attack
  – Adversary can move malicious data anywhere in the domain

\[ c_f (x_j^{\text{min}} - x_{ij}) \leq \delta_{ij} \leq C_f (x_j^{\text{max}} - x_{ij}) \]

• Targeted attack
  – Adversary can move malicious data closer to a target point

\[ 0 \leq (x_{ij}^{t} - x_{ij}) \delta_{ij} \leq C_\xi (1 - C_\delta \frac{|x_{ij}^{t} - x_{ij}|}{|x_{ij}| + |x_{ij}^{t}|}) (x_{ij}^{t} - x_{ij})^2 \]
Adversarial SVM Risk Minimization Model

SVM risk minimization model: free-range attack

$$\arg\min_{w,b,\xi_i,t_i,u_i,v_i} \frac{1}{2}||w||^2 + C \sum_i \xi_i$$

s.t.

$$\xi_i \geq 0$$
$$\xi_i \geq 1 - y_i \cdot (w \cdot x_i + b) + t_i$$
$$t_i \geq \sum_j C_f \left(v_{ij} (x_{j}^{\text{max}} - x_{ij}) - u_{ij} (x_{j}^{\text{min}} - x_{ij})\right)$$
$$u_i - v_i = \frac{1}{2} (1 + y_i) w$$
$$u_i \geq 0$$
$$v_i \geq 0$$
SVM risk minimization model: targeted attack

\[
\begin{aligned}
\arg\min_{w,b,\xi_i,t_i,u_i,v_i} & \quad \frac{1}{2}||w||^2 + C \sum_i \xi_i \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad \xi_i \geq 0 \\
& \quad \xi_i \geq 1 - y_i \cdot (w \cdot x_i + b) + t_i \\
& \quad t_i \geq \sum_j e_{ij}u_{ij} \\
& \quad (-u_i + v_i) \circ (x_i^t - x_i) = \frac{1}{2}(1 + y_i)w \\
& \quad u_i \geq 0 \\
& \quad v_i \geq 0 \\
\end{aligned}
\]
**AD-SVM Example:**

The **black dashed** line is the standard SVM classification boundary, and the **blue line** is the Adversarial SVM (ADV-SVM) classification boundary.
Summary of [5]

- AD-SVM solves a convex optimization problem where the constraints are tied to adversarial attack models.
- AD-SVM is more resilient to modest attacks than other SVM learning algorithms.
• Goal: devising classifiers which are robust to classification phase noise
  – Instances drawn \( i.i.d. \) from some

\[
\mathcal{X} \times \{\pm 1\}, \quad \mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n
\]

  – Linear margin-based classifiers
  – A clean, uncorrupted training data is available for learning a classifier \(<w,b>\)
Problem Setting

Trained Classifier

\[
\begin{array}{ccccccc}
  w_1 & w_2 & \ldots & w_i & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots \\
  b
\end{array}
\]

Test Dataset

\[
\begin{array}{ccccccc}
  x_{11} & x_{12} & \ldots & x_{1i} & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots \\
  x_{21} & x_{22} & \ldots & x_{2i} & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots \\
  \ldots & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots \\
  x_{N1} & x_{N2} & \ldots & x_{Ni} & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots \\
\end{array}
\]
Problem Setting cont.

• Adversary’s power must be reasonably bounded for learning to be possible.
• Suppose each feature $j$ has a fixed feature value $v_j \geq 0$.
• Assumption: the adversary must leave intact a subset $J$ in \{1, ..., $n$\} of features such that

$$V(J) := \sum_{j \in J} v_j \geq P$$

where $P$ specifies noise tolerance.
LP Formulation

- Worst-case “empirical risk” on training set:

\[ \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \min_{J: V([n] \setminus J) \leq N} y_i \left( b + \sum_{j \in J} w_j x_{i,j} \right) \leq 0 \]

- An SVM-like formulation:

\[
\min_{w,b,\xi} \frac{1}{m\gamma} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \xi_i \\
\text{s.t.} \quad \forall i \in [m] \quad \forall J : V([n] \setminus J) \leq N \\
y_i \left( b + \sum_{j \in J} w_j x_{i,j} \right) \geq \frac{\gamma V(J)}{P} - \xi_i \\
\forall i \in [m] \quad \xi_i \geq 0, \quad ||w||_\infty \leq C.
\]

Problem: exponential growth of the constraint set
A Compact LP Formulation

- With a duality transform, a compact $O(mn)$ constraint set is obtained:

\[
\begin{align*}
\min & \quad \frac{1}{m\gamma} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \xi_i \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad \forall i \in [m] \quad P\lambda_i - \sum_{j=1}^{n} \alpha_{i,j} + y_i b \geq -\xi_i \\
& \quad \forall i \in [m] \forall j \in [n] \quad y_i w_{j} x_{i,j} - \frac{\gamma_{ij}}{P} \geq \lambda_{i} v_{j} - \alpha_{i,j} , \\
& \quad \forall i \in [m] \forall j \in [n] \quad \alpha_{i,j} \geq 0 , \\
& \quad \forall i \in [m] \quad \lambda_{i} \geq 0 \text{ and } \xi_{i} \geq 0 , \\
& \quad \|w\|_{\infty} \leq C ,
\end{align*}
\]

An online-to-batch algorithm is developed to learn the average hypothesis.
Problem: Content-based spam filtering

• Practice: good word attacks
  – Passive attacks
  – Active attacks

• Theory: ACRE learning
Passive Attacks

- Common heuristics
  - Random dictionary words
  - Most frequent English words
  - Highest ratio: English frequency/spam frequency
Active Attacks

• Learn which words are best by querying the spam filter.
• First-$N$: Find $n$ good words using as few queries as possible
• Best-$N$: Find the best $n$ words
**Adversarial Classifier Reverse Engineering (ACRE)**

- **ACRE** \(k\)-learnable algo.: minimize \(a(x)\) subject to \(c(x) = -1\) within a factor of \(k\), given:

  - the adversarial cost function \(a(x)\)
  - One positive and one negative example, \(x^+\) and \(x^-\)
  - A polynomial number of membership queries
ACRE $k$-learnability of Linear Classifiers

- Linear classifiers with *continuous* features are ACRE $(1+\varepsilon)$-learnable under linear cost functions.

- Linear classifiers with *boolean* features are ACRE 2-learnable under uniform linear cost functions.
Modeling Adversarial Learning as Nested Stackelberg Games [6]

- Existing adversarial learning approaches
  - A two-player game
    - Zero-sum, Nash, Stackelberg
  - AD-SVM, AD-RVM, AD-HME
    - handle a single adversary of one type
- A more challenging problem:
  - Multiple adversaries of various types
Adversarial Learning: Multiple Adversaries of Various Types

Training data → Learning Model

Adversary

random, $x^+$ only, $x^+$ and $x^-$, ...

Test Data

Single Leader Single Follower
Single Leader Multiple Followers
Nested Stackelberg Game Framework

**Leader:**
Learning Model

**SLSF**

**Follower:**
Adversary corrupting data

**Followers:**
Adversaries of various types

**Leader:**
learning model playing a mixed strategy

**Component Strategies**

**SLMF**
Single Leader Single Follower Stackelberg Game

- Learner commits its strategy that is observable to the adversary
- Adversary plays its optimal strategy
  - Maximize learner’s loss
  - Minimize adversary’s loss

\[
\text{argmin}_{w^*} \text{argmax}_{\delta^*_{x}} L_l(w, x, \delta^*_{x})
\]
\[
s.t. \quad \delta^*_{x} \in \text{arg min}_{\delta_x} L_f(w, x, \delta_x)
\]
SLMF Bayesian Stackelberg Game

Problem Definition:

Given the payoff matrices $R^l$ and $R^f$ of the leader and the $m$ followers of $n$ different types, find the leader’s optimal mixed strategy.

• All followers know the leader’s strategy when optimizing their rewards.
• The leader’s pure strategies consist of a set of generalized linear learning models $\langle \varphi(x), w \rangle$.
• The followers’ pure strategies include a set of vectors performing data transformation $x \rightarrow x + \Delta x$. 
SLMF Bayesian Stackelberg Game

- The leader makes its decision prior to the followers’ decisions.
- The leader does not know the exact type of the adversary while solving its optimization problem.
- The followers play their optimal responses to maximize the payoffs given the leader’s strategy.
Mixed Strategy Classification

X: input

\[ C_2(X) = Y \]
APPLICATIONS
Malicious PDF Detection using Metadata and Structural Features [10]

- PDF Basics
  - Tree structure
  - Root note: /Catalog
  - Other valid elements are in the downward path of /Catalog

- Header
  - %PDF-1.1

- Body
  - Sequence of objects

- Cross Reference Table
  - xref

- Trailer
Malicious PDF Exploitation

• PDF Document Exploitation
  – Malicious PDFs may contain the complete malware payload or small size code for downloading other malware components
  – Suspicious elements
    • Javascript
    • Embedded PDFs
    • Malformed objects
    • Malicious patterns
    • Encryption
    • Suspicious actions: /Actions, /OpenAction, /Names, et. al.
Feature Extraction

- Static analysis on features based on document structure and metadata.
  - works well even on encrypted documents each object/stream is encrypted individually in PDF, leaving structure and metadata to be extracted the same as normal documents.
Dual Classifier

• Dual classifier
  – One differentiates *benign* from *malicious*.
  – The other classifier differentiates *opportunistic* from *targeted* malicious documents.
Data & Classifier Performance

- *Contagio & Operational datasets*
  - Subsample of *Contagio* for training
  - Test classifier on *Operational*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Testing/Operational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>benign (ben)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>99,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opportunistic (opp)</td>
<td>4,802</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>targeted (tar)</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 10-fold cross-validation on training data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classifier</th>
<th>Error Rate</th>
<th>Train Time</th>
<th>Classify Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naive Bayes</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>2 sec</td>
<td>95 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Forest</td>
<td>.19%</td>
<td>92 sec</td>
<td>1 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Vector Machine</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>218 sec</td>
<td>33 sec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Classification & Detection Performance

ROC for Training Set (ben/mal)  ROC for Training Set (opp/tar)

Attack on previous work!

• Investigate a real learning-based system—PDFRATE
  – Random Forest classifier
    • Not resilient to malicious noise
    • Periodic retraining is not implemented in the system.
  – The attacker modifies the submitted PDF file, with its malicious functionality intact, and decrease the probabilistic score returned by PDFRATE.
    • Insert dummy content into PDF files
Modification of PDF Docs

PDF readers jump from Trailer directly to the Cross-reference table, skipping injected content completely.
Attacks

• Mimicry Attack
  – transform a malicious sample so that it mimics a chosen benign sample as much as possible.

• Gradient Descent and Kernel Density Estimation (GD- KDE) Attack
  – require the knowledge of a specific learned model and a set of benign samples
  – only applicable to differentiable classifiers, such as SVM, artificial neural network
Results

- Baseline: results before attacks, all but 3 receives 100% PDF Score.
- Except for mimicry F, 75% of the attacks would be classified as benign if a 50% threshold over classification scores were used for decision making.
Defensive Measures

• Vaccination defense
  – modify a fraction of malicious samples in the training dataset in such a way that they are more similar to *expected* attack samples.
  – Only effective against *correctly anticipated* attacks
Practical Adversarial Detection of Malicious Crowdsourcing Workers [14]

- Investigating robustness of machine learning based approaches to detecting adversaries in crowdsourcing
  - Envision attack
  - Poisoning attack
Experimental Setup

- **Datasets**
  - Extract from Sina Weibo, China’s microblogging network
    - 28,947 crowdturfing workers
    - 71,890 authenticated users
    - 371,588 active users with at least 50 followers and 10 tweets
  - Classify these accounts using SVMs, Bayesian, Decision Trees and Random Forests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th># Weibo IDs</th>
<th># (Re) Tweets</th>
<th># Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turfing</td>
<td>28,947</td>
<td>18,473,903</td>
<td>15,970,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authent.</td>
<td>71,890</td>
<td>7,600,715</td>
<td>13,985,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>371,588</td>
<td>34,164,885</td>
<td>75,335,276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Classifier Performance

- **Authenticated+Turfing** Dataset:
  - 28K turfing accounts, 28K randomly sampled “authenticated” users.

- **Active+Turfing** Dataset:
  - 28K turfing accounts, 28K randomly sampled “active” users.
Impact of Evasion Attacks

- **Optimal Evasion Attack:**
  - *Per-worker optimal evasion:* exhaustive search for optimal data modification
  - *Global evasion:* exhaustive search for global optimal strategy
  - *Feature-aware evasion:* alter the (known) most important features
Impact of Evasion Attacks (cont.)

- **Practical Evasion Attack:**
  - Random evasion
  - Value distance-aware evasion
  - Distribution distance-aware evasion
Impact of Poisoning Attacks

• Training data used to build ML classifiers is contaminated.
  – Poisoning training dataset by *injecting random* normal user samples to the turfing class.

(a) Professional Workers

(b) All Workers
Impact of Poisoning Attacks (cont.)

- Training data used to build ML classifiers is contaminated.
  - Adversaries *inject specific type of normal users* to the turfing class (all workers).

(a) Injecting Accounts with > 50% tweets commented  
(b) Injecting Accounts with < 150 followers
Impact of Poisoning Attacks (cont.)

- Training data used to build ML classifiers is contaminated.
  - Poisoning training dataset by adding turfing samples to normal class.
Impact of Poisoning Attacks (cont.)

- Instead of adding data to the training set, data in the training set is altered.
Behavioral Detection of Malware on Mobile Handsets [12]

- Mobile Malware Detection
  - signature-based solutions are not efficient for resource-constrained mobile devices
  - behavioral detection solution to detecting mobile worms, viruses and Trojans
    - Monitor the run-time behavior of an application (e.g., file accesses, API calls)
    - More resilient to polymorphic worms and code obfuscation
    - Database of behavior profiles is much smaller than that needed for storing payload signatures
Challenges

- Behavior specification
  - temporal logic of causal knowledge

- Online reconstruction of suspicious behavior
  - Train a SVM to differentiate partial signatures for malicious behavior from those of normal applications.
  - The resulting SVM model and the malicious signature database are preloaded onto the handset.
System Overview
Behavior Signature of Commwarrior Worm
Two-stage Runtime Behavior Signature Construction

- Stage 1: generation of dependency graph
Two-stage Runtime Behavior Signature Construction cont.

- Stage 2: graph pruning and aggregation

• The distributed SVM for detecting mobile malware:
  – lightweight in terms of bandwidth usage
  – preserve the privacy of the participating users
  – automatically generate a general behavioral signature of malware
Distributed SVM Learning

- Divide the quadratic SVM binary classification problem into multiple sub-problems by relaxing it using a penalty function.
- Next, distributed continuous- and discrete-time gradient algorithms are applied to solve the relaxed problem iteratively.
Empirical Results

- MIT Reality Mining user data
  - 897922 communication logs collected from 97 users
  - Infect half of data set with malware symptoms
Computational Requirement

avg. computation time/client  avg. number of updates/client

![Graph showing computational time and updates per client vs. number of clients.](image-url)
Outside the closed world: On using machine learning for network intrusion detection [9]

• Network Intrusion Detection:
  – Misuse detection – precise descriptions of known malicious behavior.
  – Anomaly detection – flag deviations from normal activities.
Machine Learning in Intrusion Detection

- Well-known problems:
  - High false positive rate
  - Lack of attack-free data for training
    - Theoretical results indicate this is should not be an issue for big data
  - Attackers can foil the system to evade detection
    - More resistant techniques now available as we discussed before
  - Difficulties with Evaluation
Machine Learning in Intrusion Detection

- Challenges of ML for NID
  - Outlier Detection
  - High Cost of Errors
  - Semantic Gap (interpretation of results)
  - Diversity of Network Traffic
Recommendations for Using Machine Learning

Understand what the system is doing!

• Recommendations:
  – Understanding the Threat Model
    • What kind of environment does the system target?
    • What do missed attacks cost?
    • What skills and resources will attackers have?
    • What concern does evasion pose?
  – Keep the Scope Narrow
  – Reducing the Costs
  – Evaluation
    • Working with data
    • Understanding results
• Domain-specific challenge:
  – An extensive amount of research on machine learning-based anomaly detection, versus the lack of operational deployments of such systems.
  – Now start-ups are trying to change that.

• Follow a set of guidelines for applying ML to network intrusion detection
  – obtain *insight* into the operation of an anomaly detection system *from an operational point of view*.
  – *Semantic* understanding of the gain on ROC curves is crucial.
CONCLUSIONS
Lessons Learned

- Data Mining for Cyber Security requires better understanding of attacker.
  - Game theory provides natural tools for such modeling
- Dynamic adaptation, cost of adaptation, utility of the attacker and defender needs to be considered.
- Other issues not discussed but important:
  - Provenance of data
  - Class Imbalance
  - Adversarial Active Learning
Main Take Away

• “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” — Sun Tzu, The Art of War

• Choose the features carefully.
  – Understand attacker capabilities and potential adaptation

• Use robust machine learning techniques

• Scale to large data
Choosing right features for classification

- As game theoretical models indicate, good features are:
  - Hard for attacker to manipulate; and
  - Indicative of the attack

- **Example: Malware detection**
  - Focus on more behavioral features than syntactic features extracted from binary?
Choosing the right machine learning tool

- Trying large set of tools are critical
  - Random forest
  - SVM
  - Neural networks
  - Deep belief networks etc.
  - Ad-Svm
  - Others ??
Scaling to large data

- Efficient distributed processing systems
  - Hadoop/MapReduce
  - Spark
  - Storm
  - Others
Apache Spark

• is a fast and general-purpose cluster computing system.
• provides high-level APIs in Java, Scala and Python, and an optimized engine that supports general execution graphs.
• supports a rich set of higher-level tools:
  – Spark SQL for SQL and structured data processing
  – MLlib for machine learning,
    • Many algorithms..
  – GraphX for graph processing, and
  – Spark Streaming.
Acknowledgement

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More papers on the topic could be found on the data mining for cyber security course web page:

http://www.utdallas.edu/~muratk/courses/dbmsec-15s.html
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